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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court in that this matter was poured over from the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Respondent substantially agrees that the Issues Presented for Review are as stated by 
the Appellant. The Respondent agrees that the standard of review for the two issues presented is 
abuse of discretion. In addition, the threshold question decided by the court below, that there 
was no substantial change of circumstances, is also reviewed for abuse of discretion and that 
such determination of the court "is presumed valid." Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 Utah Ct. App. 
1999), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 89 (Utah 1999). 
4 
DETERMINITIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-10.4: 
"(1) On the petition of one or both of the parents, or the joint legal or physical custodians 
if they are not the parents, the court may, after a hearing, modify or terminate an order that 
established joint legal or physical custody if: 
(a) the verified petition or accompanying affidavit initially alleges that admissible 
evidence will show that the circumstances of the child or one or both parents or joint 
legal or physical custodians have materially and substantially changed since the entry of 
the order to be modified:" 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties to this appeal, the parents of two minor children Kyle J. Elison (Date of Birth: 
November 10, 2001) and Kaylee A. Elison (Date of Birth: September 13, 2003), were divorced 
in accordance with a Decree of Divorce dated July 1st, 2005 and granted joint legal custody. See 
Decree of Divorce attached hereto as Addendum 1. (R. 181-189). In February of 2009 the 
Appellant filed a petition to modify the decree in anticipation of her move out of state (R. 201). 
In accordance with paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce, which states that under such 
circumstances the Respondent father will "be designated as the primary physical custodian" of 
5 
the minor children, the Court ordered on July 8, 2009 that the Father would be named the 
primary physical custodian and that the petition to modify the Decree of Divorce was denied. 
See the Order Re: July 8, 2009 Hearing attached as Addendum 2 (R. 345). 
The Appellant then filed a motion to set aside the order (R. 297) which was denied by the 
court (R. 328). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On July 14, 2005, a Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter in the Fifth 
District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, Case No. 04 450 0347. See Decree of Divorce (EL 
181-189) attached as Addendum #1. 
2. The Decree of Divorce awarded the parties joint legal custody. See Decree of 
Divorce, paragraph 2, attached as Addendum #1 (R. 181). 
3. Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce provides that "Pursuant to agreement, if 
Petitioner moves from the State of Utah, other than the Las Vegas area, the children shall remain 
in Utah with Respondent who will then be designated as the primary physical custodian." See 
Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce, attached as Addendum #1 (R. 181). 
4. Subsequently, the father moved to Salt Lake City, Utah and the mother moved to 
St. George, Utah. (R. 238). 
5. On February 19, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, 
requesting a modification of paragraph 7 of the decree, to facilitate her second move, this time to 
Flagstaff, Arizona. (R. 201 and 238). 
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6. On July 8,2009, the court ruled that Petitioner's move out of the State of Utah to 
Flagstaff, Arizona was an event anticipated by the provisions of Paragraph 7 of the Decree of 
Divorce and that there was therefore no substantial change of circumstances and that therefore in 
accordance with the Decree of Divorce, "the parties' minor children shall remain in Utah with 
the Respondent who shall now be designated as the primary physical custodian." See Order Re: 
July 8,2009 Hearing attached as Addendum #2, (R.345). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant's assertion, that it is error for the district court to make a ruling on a petition 
for modification of a divorce decree to change custody without examining the best interests of 
the children, is contrary to Utah law. A petition to modify a decree of divorce is granted, both by 
statute and by case law, only if there is first established a material and substantial change in 
circumstances. The best interests of the children are only examined if the substantial change is 
first proved. The district court correctly ruled that because the move to Arizona by the Appellant 
(the alleged change in circumstances) was anticipated by the Decree of Divorce, such a change 
was insufficient to establish a material and substantial change in circumstances. Having failed to 
establish the first prong of substantial change, it was not necessary to examine the second prong 
of best interests of the children. 
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The Decree of Divorce acts as res judicata to the petition and motions brought by the 
Appellant unless the Appellant complies with the statutory and case law requirement of proving 
substantial change. The Appellant failed to do so and therefore the doctrine of res judicata bars 
the requested relief. The district court properly acted within its discretion in denying the change 
of custody. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1: MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IS BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA UNLESS THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The court below properly dismissed Appellant's petition and denied her requested relief. 
The doctrine of Res Judicata bars the requested relief. "The doctrine of res judicata applies in 
divorce actions and subsequent modification proceedings." Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 
(Utah App. 1990). Modification of a divorce decree is allowed only because of the continuing 
jurisdiction of the divorce court, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5, but even when a 
proper petition to modify is brought, "a custody decree, which is predicated on a particular set of 
facts, is res judicata and will not be modified in the absence of a showing of a substantial or 
material change in circumstances which warrants doing so." Smith at page 410, citing Hogge v. 
Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 53 (Utah 1982), Trego v. Trego, 565 P.2d 74,75 (Utah 1977); and Smith v. 
Smith, 564 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1977). 
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This principle is codified in Utah Code Annotated §30-3-10.4 which provides the 
statutory basis and means for modification of the decree and explicitly states that such a 
modification is only proper if the petition demonstrates "that the circumstances of the child or 
one or both parents or joint legal or physical custodians have materially and substantially 
changed since the entry of the order to be modified . . . . " See §30-3-10.4(l)(a) (emphasis added). 
Without a finding of substantial and material change, the provisions of the decree remain in 
effect and modification of the decree is barred by Res Judicata. 
Res judicata is an essential doctrine in the arena of divorce and custody. The principle 
provides stability for the child and preserves the finality of judgments. See Elmer v. Elmer, 116 
P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1989). And although the res judicata effect is less strictly applied in a case 
involving a stipulated divorce decree, a petitioner must still satisfy the burden of showing a 
substantial change in circumstances to avoid res judicata. As stated in Cummings v. Cummings, 
821 P.2d 472, 477 (Utah App. 1991): 
"Most divorce decrees are obtained through stipulation and it usually is in 
the best interests of the parties as well as the judicial system to encourage 
settlement of issues by the parties themselves. Therefore, unless the party seeking 
a change of custody establishes that there were unusual circumstances at the time 
of the prior stipulation, a material and substantial change of circumstances as 
described in Utah case law must be established. In those cases where the moving 
party does not plead and prove that exceptional circumstances existed at the time 
of the earlier stipulation, we also believe the trial court can, in its discretion 
disallow evidence of best interests. Otherwise, we will experience the evils of 
ping-pong awards and recurring litigation predicted in Hogge and Becker, or, 
alternatively, stipulated custody orders will disappear. " (emphasis added). 
9 
The doctrine of Res Judicata bars modification without a finding of substantial and material 
change. 
Point 2: THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANT'S 
PETITION TO MODIFY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES AND THERE WAS THEREFORE NO 
NEED TO ADDRESS THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN. 
Appellant asserts that the court erred in failing to address the best interests of the children 
in its order denying modification of the Decree of Divorce. Utah Courts have developed a two-
prong test for determining whether a decree may be modified despite the res judicata effect of the 
decree, which was described by the Court in Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) as 
follows: 
" . . . [T]he trial court's decision whether to modify the provisions of a custody 
decree to transfer custody to another party involves two steps: (1) an initial decision 
whether there are changed circumstances warranting the exercise of the court's 
continuing jurisdiction to reconsider the custody award, and, if so, (2) a subsequent 
decision as to the manner in which custody should be modified, if at all." 
Subsequently, courts have determine that this two-prong Hogge test requires a finding of 
changed circumstances before addressing the issue of best interests of the child. In Hudema v. 
Hudema, 989 P.2d 491 (Utah CtApp. 1999) restated the test to state that 
"Before modifying a custody order, the court conducts a bifurcated inquiry to 
determine, first, if there has been a substantial and material change in the ciurcumstances 
upon which the award was based, and, if so whether a modification is in the best interest 
of the child." 
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Hudema at page 497, citing Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10.4 (1998); Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 
602 (Utah 1989); and Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 &n. 5 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). The Hudema 
court concluded, citing Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 650-51 (Utah Ct.App. 1997), that 
"Consequently, the court generally may not consider evidence of the child's best interests until it 
finds changed circumstances." Hudema at page 498, emphasis added. 
As set forth in Appellant's brief, the basis of the Petition to Modify was the move by the 
Appellant from the State of Utah. The parties initially were granted joint legal custody of the 
children under the stipulated Decree of Divorce. The stipulated Decree also provided that if a 
party were to move from the State of Utah to anywhere other than the Las Vegas, Nevada area, 
custody would be awarded to the party remaining in Utah. The Appellant's move to Flagstaff, 
Arizona was anticipated by the Decree of Divorce and paragraph 7 of the Decree provided that 
the father would have custody of the children if the Appellant in fact moved from the State of 
Utah to a place other than the Las Vegas area. After a hearing, the Fifth District Court awarded 
custody to the respondent, in accordance with the Decree of Divorce. 
However, as a matter of law, the move by Appellant is not a material or substantial 
change in circumstances because it was anticipated in paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce. 
"
 ft0n a petition for a modification of a divorce decree, the threshold requirement 
for relief is a showing of a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry 
of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself.' Moore v. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054, 
1055 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) (quotations an citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). If a 
change in circumstances is 'reasonably contemplated at the time of divorce[, then it] is 
not legally cognizable as a substantial change in circumstances in modification 
proceedings.' Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726,729 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) 
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Wall v. Wall 157 P.3d 341 (Utah Ct.App. 2007). See also e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 
250, 253 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) ("However, where a future change in circumstances is 
contemplated by the trial court in the divorce decree, the fulfillment of that future change will 
not constitute a material change of circumstances sufficient to modify the award."); and Stettler v. 
Stettler, 713 P.2d 699, 700 (Utah 1985) ("On a petition for a modification of a divorce decree, 
the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of a substantial change in circumstances 
occurring since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself."). 
Appellant argues that Utah case law requires an examination of the best interests of the 
children whenever there is a petition to modify, but this argument is not supported by the cited 
cases. The cases stand only for the proposition that when there is a substantial change in 
circumstances, the court must also find that the modification is also in the best interests of the 
children under the two prong Hogge test. For instance, in Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 650-
51 (Utah Ct.App. 1997), cited by the Appellants for the proposition that it is an abuse of 
discretion to fail to address the best interest of the children, the court specifically stated 
"Even when the original custody determination did not involve a thorough 
examination into the child's best interests, as in this case, Utah law requires that when 
ruling on a petition requesting a change in a child's custody, the trial court 'still must 
conduct a separate analysis and make separate findings as to [a] substantial change in 
circumstances.' Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,475 (Utah CT.App. 1991). Then, 
c[o]nly if a substantial change of circumstances is found should the trial court consider 
whether a change of custody is appropriate given the child's best interests.'" 
Under Wright, it is only an abuse of discretion if a court modifies the decree and thereby changes 
custody without both a finding of a substantial change in circumstances and that the change is in 
12 
the best interest of the children. Wright does not stand for the proposition that the best interests 
of the children must be examined in cases, such as the present one, in which there is no material 
or substantial change in circumstances. 
Contrary to the assertion of Appellant, the interest of the children has been addressed. As 
noted in the court's opinion, the court had already addressed the best interest of the children in 
the original Decree of Divorce. See Order Re: July 8, 2009, paragraph 13 (R. 345). It is simply 
unnecessary to readdress the issue of the children's best interest because there is no substantial 
change in circumstances. It should also be noted that contrary to Appellant's brief at page 9, the 
case of Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 P.2d 1248,1251 (Utah 1987) does not support the 
Appellant's position. Kishpaugh presented a custody dispute between a natural parent and the 
maternal grandparents. The court found there to be a presumption "in favor of a natural parent 
who has the care, custody, and control of his or her child." See Kishpaugh, at page 1250. 
However, this presumption is not implicated in the present action as the Appellant and 
Respondent are both natural parents of the children. 
The district court properly acted within its discretion in denying the petition to modify 
brought by the Appellant because the change in circumstances was anticipated by the Decree of 
Divorce. The move was anticipated in the Decree of divorce and therefore cannot be the basis 
for a substantial change of circumstances. The petition was properly dismissed. Because the 
court did not find a material or substantial change in circumstances, there was no need for a 
finding on the best interest of the children. The district court acted properly in denying the 
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petition and in denying the motion for a new trial which was based upon the same argument. 
(See Appellant's Summary of the Argument at page 7 of its brief stating that the motion for new 
trial "was based, in part, on the argument that the district court had to first make factual findings 
that a change in custody is in the children's best interests."). The District Court acted within its 
discretion in denying the motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly required that before the best interests of the children could be 
addressed, the Appellant bore the burden of establishing a material and substantial change in 
circumstances. Because the alleged change was the Appellant's move to Arizona, which event 
was anticipated in the Decree of Divorce, there was no material and substantial change and 
therefore no justification of modification of the decree. The action was therefore barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. The district court acted within its discretion in denying the petition to 
modify and denying the motion for new trial based upon the same argument. 
Respondent requests that this Court affirm the decision of the district court. 
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Dated this 27th day of October, 2010 
FREDERICK A. JACKMAN PC 
Jackman 
Attorney for Respondent and Apellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The udersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the 23 day of October, 2010, to the following: 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
David S. Dolowitz 
Bradley M. Strassberg 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Dovey Ro 
Legal Assistant 
ADDENDUM #1 
Decree of Divorce dated July 1st, 2005 
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AUG-25-2010 WED 08:25 AM 5 t h DIST. CT ST GEORGE FAK NO. 14359865723 P. 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
im^l\k AM 10:27 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By; Stephen W. Julien, #01765 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
965 South Main Street, Suite 3 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Phone:(435)586-2571 ext 11 
Fax: (435) 586-1013 
Toll free: 800-662-1772 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
40 NORTH 100 EAST, CEDAR CITY, UTAH 84720 
AMBER S-ELISGN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
CLINTON J. ELISON, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF UTAH, Office of 
Recovery Services, 
Intervener. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 044500347 
Judge G. Michael Westfall 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on May 31,2005 pursuant to 
a certain Notice of Bench Trial dated May 10,2001 The Honorable G. Michael Westfall 
presided Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by Stephen W, Julien. 
Respondent appeared in person but was not represented by counsel The State of Utah, 
Office of Recovery Services, was represented by Paul F. Graf. The Court conducted a 
discussion of the issues in the case, and it was agreed that the Petitioner and Respondent 
had reached an agreement on all issues as set forth in their Stipulation. The Intervener 
IRON COUNTY 
«dz&_ 
AUG-25-2010 RED 08:26 AM 5 th DIST. CT ST GEORGE FAX HO. 14359885723 P. 
Ainber S. EUsoa v, Clinton J. Elisoru $&fc of Urah, Offbc of R&ovay Services 
Civil No. 0445Q&47 \ Decree of Divert© 
opposed the child support amount set forth in the Stipulation, and a hearing was 
conducted to resolve that issue. The Court now having heard from the witnesses, 
listened to the arguments presented, and reviewed the papers filed, and having made and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now upon motion of the Petitioner: 
IT IS HEREIN ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
14 That the bonds of matrimony and the marriage contract heretofore existing 
by and between the Petitioner and the Respondent fefra&d.ths* wmr are herein dissolved, 
and Petitioner and Respondent asrawarded a Decree of Divorce from tib other on the fa/fit ^)|^^^r 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decreet* become final fefflrcdialcly upon-
• entry by the Coum 
2. The parties are awarded the joint legal custody of their two minor 
children, namely: KMI4RBUS0N, born November 9,2001; and KflHfr A M 
EUSON, born September!!* 2003. Petitioner is designated as the primary physical 
custodian and her residence the primary residence of the children. 
3. The following shall be the parenting plan: 
A. The parties shall meet no less than once each month, whether in 
person or by telephone, to discuss the children, their welfare, best interests, and to make 
decisions concerning the best interests of the children. 
B, In the event that no decision can be reached concerning a specific 
course of conduct related to the parties" minor children, the final decision shall rest with 
the primary caregiver. 
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Aniber S. Eiisan v, Clinton J. Elison, State of Utah, Office of Recovwy Service 
Civil NP, 0445OQ347 \ Dccrcs of Divorce 
C- The parties shall always recognize the preferred caregiver status of 
Respondent, and shall make every effort to see that Respondent is given the opportunity 
to provide daycare for the children when he is available to do so when Petitioner is away 
from the children for at least four hours, 
D. Respondent's rights of parent-time with the children shall be as the 
parties may determine and agree, bearing in mind Respondent's preferred status as a 
caregiver for the children, hi the event the parties cannot agree concerning Respondent's 
right of parent-time, then his rights of parent-time shall be not less than those set forth within 
the provisions of Utah Code Aim, §§30-3-32 through 30-3-36, attached as Exhibit A. 
R In the event that a decision readied by the primary caregiver, 
pursuant to the authority granted above, is unacceptable to Respondent, Respondent may 
seek relief through the courts. 
F. Neither party shall say anything derogatory about the other party, 
or about friends or family of the other party in the presence of the minor children, 
G< Neither party shall use any illegal substances or have any around 
the premises. 
H. Neither party shall have a person of the opposite sex to whom they 
are unrelated over night in their home while the children are present 
4« Pick up and return of the children shall occur at the Family Support Center 
in Cedar City or as worked out by the parties. 
5. The costs associated with parent-time shall be split equally by the parties. 
3 
AUG-25-2010 WED 08:27 AM 5th DIST. CT ST GEORGE FAX NO. 14359865723 
Amber S. Eton v. C l t e i I EH$cm> State of Ufch, Office of Recovery Services 
Civil No, 0445DQ347 \ Decree of Divorce 
6. For emergency purposes, whenever the children travel with either party, 
the party shall give notice of the foEowing: 
A. an itinerary of travel dates; 
B. destinations; 
C. places where the children or traveling party can be reached; and 
D. the name and telephone number of an available third person having 
knowledge of the children's location. 
7. If either party decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more 
from the residence specified in the Court's Decree, that parent shall provide 60 days 
advance written notice, if possible, of the intended relocation to the other party. The 
Court may, upon motion of any party or upon the Court's own motion* schedule a hearing 
with notice to review the parent-time schedule and make appropriate orders regarding 
parent-time and the costs of transportation in exercising parent-time. Pursuant to 
agreement, if Petitioner moves from ihe state of Utah, other than the Las Vegas area, the 
children shall remain in Utah with Respondent who will then be designated as the 
primary physical custodian. In the evert Respondent moves from the state of Utah* his 
parent-time out of state shall consist of 30 days in the summer, the Thanksgiving holiday 
period in even numbered years, the Christmas hoEday period and spring break in odd 
numbered years and at other times as worked out by the parties. Petitioner shall have the 
same parent-time schedule if she is the one that moves. In the event Respondent moves 
from the state of Utah, Petitioner may also move out of Utah with the minor children. 
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8. Each party's child support obligation is set at $245 a month, as set forth in 
Exhibit B, Respondent's child support obligation is retroactive to December, 2004 . 
9, Either party or the intervener may bring the child support issue before the 
Court. Respondent's obligation to pay child support for each of the minor children shall 
terminate when the youngest child reaches eighteen (18) years of age, or until the month 
after the child's normal and expected date of graduation from high school, whichever 
occurs latter. Respondent's obligation to pay child support for the minor children shall 
be automatically adjusted to reflect the base combined child support obligation sbown in 
the table for the remaining number of children due child support. Except during periods 
of court-ordered visitation when physical custody changes, the parent without physical 
custody shall be required to pay the amount of support set forth above without the need to 
modify this order* 
10* Respondent shall be awarded a fifty percent (50%) reduction in his base 
child support award for time periods that Petitioner has the children for at least twenty-
five (25) of any thirty (30) consecutive days. If the dependent children are recipients of 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANK), any agreement by tbe parties for the 
reduction of child support during the extended visitation shall be approved by the Office 
of Recovery Services. Noimal weekend visitation and holiday visits to the custodial 
parent shall not be considered as interruption of the consecutive day requirement. 
11. Respondent's income is subject to withholding for the payment of his 
child support obligations herein. 
5 
AUG-25-2010 WED 08:28 AM 5 t h DIST. CT ST GEORGE FAX NO. 14359865723 P 
Amber S. Elissp v. Clinton I, Elisor^ Sfete of Uiab, Otfioc of Recovery Services 
Civil No. 044500347 \ Oecrcc of Divotfc* 
12. If either party is on public assistance, the party shall notify the Office of 
Recovery Services of any changes in their residence., employment, income or medical or 
dental insurance premiums or coverage, or change in custody, not including periods of 
court-ordered parent-time. 
13. The parties shall provide medical and dental insurance for the benefit of 
the children, if it is available at a reasonable cost through their employment The cost of 
said insurance shall be split equally by the parties. Any medical and dental expenses not 
covered by insurance shall be split equally by the parties, 
14. The party having insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the 
other party, or to the Office of Recovery Services if on public assista&ce, upon initial 
enrollment of the dependent children, The party having insurance shall also notify the 
other party or the QfSce of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, 
premium., or benefits within thirty (30) days of the date of the change. 
L 5, A party incurring medical expenses shall provide written verification of 
the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other party within thirty (30) days of 
payment The other party shall make their portion of those payments or make 
arrangements to do so within forty-five (45) days of receipt of the documentation 
supporting required participation, 
16, If a party incurs medical expenses and M s to comply with the preceding 
two paragraphs, that party may be denied the right to receive credit for fee expenses, or to 
recover the other party's share. 
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17, Respondent is responsible and liable for one-half of the reasonable child 
care costs incurred each month as a result of Petitioner's work. Respondent shall pay bis 
portion of these child care costs directly to Petitioner by the 5th of each month. 
18, Each party shall maintain life insurance on his or her life for the benefit of 
the parties1 minor children, when it is reasonably available, and shall name the parties' 
children as beneficiaries on said life insurance policy, 
19, Petitioner may claim the tax exemption for K H ^ and Respondent may 
claim the tax exemption for K^P so long as he is current on his child support at the end 
of the tax year, For the year 2004, the parties shall file a joint tax return and split the tax 
refund equally. 
20, Neither party is awarded alimony. 
21, Any debts incurred by the parties from the date of the marriage to their 
separation in December, 2004 shall be paid by the party incurring the debt, including any 
student loans taken out by a party. Any debts incurred in the name of both parties shall 
be split equally by the parties, 
22* Each party shall assume and pay their own debts incurred after the parties1 
separation on or about December 7,2004. Each party shall hold the other harmless from 
any liability on these debts, 
23, The parties shall provide a copy of their Decree of Divorce to all joint 
creditors for any outstanding obligations that are included in their Decree of Divorce. 
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Therefore, the party not obligated to pay a joint obligation shall; 
A. Send a copy of the Decree of Divorce to each joint creditor he/she 
is not required to pay as soon as possible. 
B* Notify that joint creditor of the current separate address of eaeh 
party. 
C. Inform that joint creditor that each party is entitled to receive 
individual statements, notices, and correspondence required by law or by the terms of the 
contract. Also, inform the creditor that no negative credit report or other exchange of 
credit history or repayment practices may be made or a deinmd for payment on the party 
who is not required to pay the debt 
D, With regard to a creditor for medical expenses provided to a minor 
child, notify the creditor that a claim for unpaid medical expenses may not be made 
against a parent who has paid in M his or her share of the medical and dental expenses 
required to be paid by that parent 
24. The personal property shall be divided as the parties now hold it 
25. Respondent is permanently restrained from bettering, harassing, 
annoying, threatening, harming or abusing Petitioner at any time or any place, 
26. Each party is responsible and liable for their own attorney fees, service 
fees and court costs incurred as a result of this action. 
27. Bach party shall execute and deliver to die other party any documents 
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necessary to implement the provisions ofthe Decree of Divorce entered by the Court 
DATED this 1A. day of 
BY THE COURT: 
_, 2005. 
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EXHIBIT A 
30-3-35-5. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children under five years of age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children under five years old, 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall be considered the 
minimum parent-time to which the non-custodial parent and the child shall be entitled: 
(a) for children under five months of age: 
(i) six hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or the non-custodial parent 
preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or Other environment familiar to 
the child; and 
(ii) two hours on holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-3 5(2)(f) through (i) 
preferably in the custodial hom^ the established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the 
child; 
(b) for children five months of age or older> but younger than ten months of age: 
(i) nine hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or the non-custodial parent 
preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar to 
the child; and 
(ii) two hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) through 
(i) preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the 
child; 
(c) for children ten months of age or older, but younger than 18 months of age: 
(i) one eight hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(ii) one three hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(iii) eight hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-5(2)(f) through 
(i); and 
(iv) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week; 
(d) for children 18 months of age or older, but younger than three years of age: 
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and S:30 p.nL to be specified by the non-custodial 
parent or court; however if the child is being cared for during the day outside his regular place of 
residence, the non-Custodial parent may, with advance notice to the custodial parent, pick up the child 
from the caregiver at an earlier time and return him to the custodial parent by 8:30 p,tn<; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 
pjXL on Friday until 7 p JIL on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time maybe: 
(A) two One-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the non-
custodial parent; 
(B) one week shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining week shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent consistent 
with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical one-week period of uninterrupted time for 
vacation; and 
(v) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week; 
(e) for children three years of age or older, but younger than five years of age: 
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(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 pan. and 8:30 pjn, to be specified by the non-custodial 
parent or court; however, if the child is being cared for during the day outside his regular place of 
residence, the noncustodial parent may, with advance notice to the custodial parent, pick up the child from 
the caregiver at an earlier time and return him to the custodial parent by 8:30 p.m.; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 
p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m, on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsection 30-3-35(2)(o) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time with the non-custodial parent may be: 
(A) two two-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the non-
custodial parent; 
(B) one two-week period shall be uninterrupted time for the non-custodial parent; 
(C) the remaining two-week period shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time for 
vacation; and 
(v) brief phone contact with the non-custodial parent at least two times per week. 
(3) A parent shall notify the other parent at least 30 days hi advance of extended parent-time or 
vacation weeks. 
(4) Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
Amended by Chapter 25 $> 2001 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 130,2001 General Session 
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EXHIBIT A 
35-3-35. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children* S to IS years of age, 
(1) The parent-time schedule m this section applies to children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a pareataime schedule, the following schedule shall be considered the 
minimum parent-time to which the non-custodial parent and the child shall be entitled: 
(a) (i) one weekday evening to be specified by the non-custodial parent or the court from 5:30 
pjn* until 8:30 p.m.; or 
(ii) at the election of the non-cu$t6dial parent, one weekday from the time the child's school is 
regularly dismissed until 8:30 p.m., unless the court directs the application of Subsection (2)(a)(i); 
(b) (i) alternating weekends begriming on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 
pjn, on Friday until 7 p.nu on Sunday continuing each year, or 
(ii) at the election of the non-custodial parent, from the time the child's school is regularly 
dismissed on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, unless the court directs the application of Subsection 
(2Xb)(i); 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-tirae* and changes shall not be made to the 
regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule; 
(d) if a holiday MLs on a regularly scheduled school day, the non-custodial parent shall be 
responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday period 
extends beyond that time $0 that the child is free from school and the parent is free from work, the non-
custodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the non-custodial parent, parent-time over a scheduled hohday weekend 
may begin from the time the child's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday weekend 
until 7 pm. on the last day of the holiday weekend; 
(f) hi years ending in an odd number* the non-custodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before Or after the actual birtfadate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m,; at the discretion of the non-custodial parent, he may take other Siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 pjn. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.HL on the day school lets out for the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.im on Friday until Monday at 7 p*m>, unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.nx on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning $ p ,m, the day before the holiday until 7 p.m, on the 
holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) 
plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p JEL, SO long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the non-custodial parent is entitled to the following 
holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 pjn, until 9 pan*; at the discretion of the 
non-custodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 pjn. on Friday until 7 p-m. on Monday unless 
the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p jn the day before the holiday until 11 p.nu on the holiday, 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p ,m> on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m, unless fte holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial parent is completely entitled; 
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(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E«A. weekend beginning at 6 
p,m on Wednesday until Sunday a 7 pjn. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to 
which the non-custodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 pjiL on the holiday, 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p<m; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 
30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday 
is equally divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at 9 tun, 
until 7 p,m. on the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be speut with the natural or adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. 
until 7 p jm on the holiday; 
(j) extended parent-time with the non-custodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the non-custodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrapted time for the non-custodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent consistent 
with these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time during: the 
childrenls summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school* (he non-custodial parent's extended parent-time 
shall be 1/2 of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday 
and phone visits; 
(tn) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be provided at least 
30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either parent concerning 
parent-time shall be made a part of fee decree and made a part of the parent-time order. 
Amended by Chapter 9,2001 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 255,2001 General Session 
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EXHIBIT B 
THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH 
AMBER S. ELISON, 
VS, 
CLINTON J . ELISON, 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
Civ i l No. 044500347 
I 1 . Enter the # of n a t u r a l and adopted chi ldren of t h i s 
[(mother and f a t h e r for whom support i s t o be awarded* | 
1 2 a . Enter t h e f a t h e r ' s and mother ' s gross monthly 
Iincome. Refer t o In s t ruc t i ons fo r d e f i n i t i o n of I jlincome. 1 
2b . Enter p r ev ious ly ordered alimony t h a t i s ac tua l ly 
[[paid. (Do no t e n t e r alimony ordered for t h i s case) * | 
1 2 c . Enter p r e v i o u s l y ordered oh i ld support . {Do not | | en te r o b l i g a t i o n s ordered for t h e ch i ld ren i n Line 1) , \ 
| 2d* GPTIGKALt Enter the amount from Line 12 of the jjcixildreti in P resen t Home Worksheet for e i t h e r parent . 
1 3 . Sub t rac t Lines 2h, 2q, and 2d from 2a. This i s the 
((Adjusted Grose Income for ch i ld support purposes* 
| 4* Take t he COMBINED f igure i n Line 3 and the number | o f c h i l d r e n i n Line 1 to t h e support Table . Find the 
({Base Ccopbined Support Obl igat ion. Enter i t here . 
II 5 . P iv ide each pa ren t «$ adjusted monthly gross i n Line 
J 3 by t h e COMBXHEOO adjusted monthly gross i n Line 3* 
I 6* Mul t ip ly Line 4 by Line 5 for each pa ren t t o obtain {{each p a r e n t ' s share of t h e Baae Support Obligat ion. 
H02B&R FA-THEft 
77777/7//7/V///////////I //////////////////////1 
$ 893 
0 
0 j 
-
j$ 893 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
SO* 
|$ 2 4 4 , 5 0 
$ 893 
0 
0 
-
$ 823 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
50% 
[$ 2 4 4 . 5 0 
COMBINED 2
 1 
WM'M 
mum nil 
'////MM 
Pi 
ii/iimm 
$ 1786 
$ 489 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
\miiium J 
7 . BASH C&ILD SUPPORT AW&KP: Bring down, the amount i n Line 6 
f o r t h e d b l i g o r parent or e n t e r t h e amount from the Low Income 
Table . 
$ 244.BO 
8 . 
9 . 
10. 
tthich p a r e n t i s the obl igor? ( ) Mother (x) Father 
Xs the support award the same as t h e guidel ine amount i n l i n e 7? (X) Yes ( ) No 
I f NO, e n t e r t h e amount Ordered: $ , and answer number 10. 
What were t h e reasons s t a t ed by t h e Court for the deviat ion? 
( ) p r o p e r t y se t t lement 
( ) excess ive debts of t he marriage 
( ) absence of need of the c u s t o d i a l parent 
( ) o t h e r : 
A t t o r n e y Bar No. 1765 ( ) Elect ronic P i l i n g (X) Manual f i l i n g 
Bic/s4 m 
ADDENDUM #2 
Order Re: July 8, 2009 Hearing 
Shawn'!*. Karris. Wl 194 
Farris & Utiey, P.O. 
2107 W Sunset Blvd., 2nd Floor 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435)634-1600 
Fax: (435) 628-9323 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
File No. 20057.09 
M. vc 
[N THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OFJJTAH || 
AMBER. S. ELISON, aka AMBER S. 1 
1 TAYLOR, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CLINTON 1 ELISON 
Respondent 
ORDER RE: July 8, 2009 Hearing 
1 
• Civil No. 094500270 1 
:: Judge G. Rand Beacham | 
:
 • „ 1 
This case before this court for hearing July 8, 2009. The Petitioner was present along 
with her attorney of record. The Respondent was also present 
This Court hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
L The parties have two minor children, namely: KJB J^| Elison, born November H, 2001; 
and K^flfc A0t Elison, born September Wk, 2003 (hereafter collectively referred to as 
the "parties' minor children"). 
2. At the tiiBe of the Decree, both of the parties were residing in Iron County, "Utah. 
3. The final Decree was entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, 
Utah, after a trial on the child support and after stipulation of the parties being made, on 
July 14,2005. 
4. Pursuant to the Final Decree, the parties were granted joint legal custody of the panies5 
children with the Petitioner being designated the primary physical custodian of the 
parties* children, and her residence, the primary residence. There was not any address 
for the primary physical residence given, not even as much of a location other than a 
general assumption that it was Iron County; but that is not stated. 
A parenting plan was included and the Respondent's parenting time was to be at least 
pursuant to statute for joint legal custody. The pickup and return was to be at the Family 
Support Center in Cedar City. 
Paragraph 7 of the Decree has six sentences. Sentence 3 is the critical for this hearing. 
Sentences 4 and 5 are dependent on paragraph 2 and Sentence 6 is not relevant to this 
particular case. 
This court finds that the Petitioner was living in Iron County at the time of the Decree, 
and she later moved to Washington County. The parties' minor children resided with the 
Petitioner at the time of the Decree, and they have done so continually from before and 
after the time of the Decree. 
Since the entry of the Decree, both of the parties and the parties' minor children have 
moved from their residences in Iron County, Utah. 
After the entry of the Decree of Divorce, and for the past several years, the Respondent 
moved more than from Iron County, Utah to Salt Lake County, Utah: where he continues 
to reside at the residence of his sister. 
That the Decree states that: "[I]f Petitioner moves from the state of Utah, other than the 
Las Vegas area, the children should remain in Utah with Respondent who will then be 
designated as the primary physical custodian." 
The reasons for Petitioner's move to Flagstaff, Arizona are irrelevant People are entitled 
9 
lo change their residences, they're entitled to seek other employment or different 
employment or better employment. Whatever the reasons are, they are not particularly 
relevant to this case But a move has consequences when we are talking about divorced 
parents of minor children 
12. The court; by the Decree, has already ordered that custody would change if the Petitioner 
moved outside of Utah or the Las Vegas area. 
13. That court already determined that it would be m the best interests of the children for thai 
to be the order and primarily because the parties stipulated to it, so that is what the 
parties' rights are at this point in time. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered: 
(1) The parties' minor children shall remain in Utah with the Respondent who shall now be 
designated as the primary physical custodian. 
(2) The change of custody from the Petitioner to the Respondent is not a modification of the 
Decree and a temporary order is not required. 
(3) The Petitioner shall have the same parenting time schedule as the Respondent has had. 
(4) The obligations and rights of a custodial parent as imposed by the decree are all now the 
rights and obligations of the Respondent 
Dated this --- day of March, 2010. 
BY THIS COURT: 
Hon. G. Rand Beacham 
District Court Judge 
3 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
It is hereby certified that on the /o<^ day of March, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed Order was delivered by depositing a copy of the same in the U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, first-class, addressed as follows: 
Clinton J. Elison 
9884 S. Birdie Way 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
- 3TJj1ar>^ -tf-^ 
An Employee of Farris & Utley, P.C. 
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